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Key Points
·  This article explores the mix of forces explain-
ing variability in good-governance standards and 
practices by charitable foundations.  
· A six-drivers framework for explaining improved 
foundation accountability and transparency is pro-
posed and discussed in the context of a country 
study. Those drivers are: regulatory pressures, 
self-regulation, demands for information from 
donors and other relevant stakeholders, societal 
pressure derived from scandals, emulation, and 
third-party assessment.
· A simple tool for assessing foundation transpar-
ency internationally is proposed and then applied 
to corporate, endowed, and fundraising founda-
tions in the U.S. and Spain.
· Foundations’ financial structure compounds with 
institutional factors to influence the stage of devel-
opment of transparency practices, as demands for 
information from external donors are key. 
· Benchmarking reports by a third-party information 
service, providing incentives for peer emulation, 
seem to be a key driver for increased transparency 
in the case of Spanish corporate foundations.
· Implications for foundation practitioners follow, 
both relative to foundation transparency as-
sessment and advancement in general, and, in 
particular, to good governance and accountability 
of corporate and other closely held foundations.
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S E C T O R
Framing Accountability and Transparency 
in Nonprofit Organizations 
Although the roots of corporate-governance 
research can be traced back to at least Berle and 
Means (1932), subsequent literature has mainly 
focused on firms. Publicly traded companies, 
where control over capital by professional manag-
ers is separated from ownership of capital by 
shareholders, have been particularly studied in 
order to understand and to design mechanisms to 
mitigate agency problems, i.e. conflicts of interest 
arising between principals (shareholders) and 
agents (managers). The concept of transparency 
in the business sector has been extended into a 
complex information infrastructure where finan-
cial accounting information is only one of the 
elements. It has been defined as “the widespread 
availability of relevant, reliable information about 
the periodic performance, financial position, 
investment opportunities, governance, value, and 
risk” of firms (Bushman & Smith, 2003).
Not until the 1980s did literature on the specifici-
ties of governance of nonprofit organizations gain 
momentum in the U.S., led by such institutions 
as Boardsource (Rey-Garcia & Martin-Cavanna, 
2011). Since then, accountability and transparen-
cy have progressively overshadowed other aspects 
of nonprofit governance, such as the responsi-
bilities and internal functioning of boards or the 
evaluation of their performance. They have thus 
become the focus of practitioners’ interest and 
academic literature during the last decade (Dautel 
& Brudney, 2003; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Brown & 
Iverson, 2004; Bobowick, 2009). 
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Nonprofits may not be more prone to scandal 
than other types of organizations, but their pub-
lic-benefit mission and their societal status render 
them more susceptible to public disappointment. 
Another, highly sensitive, differential feature con-
sists of the tax relief available to nonprofits that 
comply with certain requirements. This ultimately 
leads their accountability and transparency duties 
to resemble those of public bodies, subject only to 
constraints imposed by the need for confidential-
ity, if social trust is to be maintained (Leat, 1994; 
Salamon, 1995). 
In fact, nonprofits have come under increased 
public scrutiny and criticism in the past few 
decades. The risk of perceived financial abuse and 
mismanagement has been fueled by publicized 
and recurring episodes of wrongdoing involv-
ing, for example, executive compensation and 
conflicts of interest by board members in the 
early 1990s and international nongovernmental 
organizations in the new millennium (Gibel-
man & Gelman, 2004). The economic crisis has 
heightened public sensitivity to governance-re-
lated issues. The broader wave of public concern 
over scandals in the business and public sectors, 
dating to the Enron and WorldCom scandals and 
the subsequent Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, has 
also contributed. Consequences internationally 
for nonprofits, charitable foundations included, 
have been notorious: increased public distrust, 
more regulation by public authorities (in the U.S., 
recurring efforts to make tax exemptions and 
deductions more stringent), and more self-regu-
lation, including the adoption of ethics and good-
governance codes (Herzlinger, 1996; Independent 
Sector, 2007; Warren & Lloyd, 2009). 
As a result of these social, ethical, and regula-
tory forces, all nonprofits are being held increas-
ingly accountable for their finances, governance, 
performance, and mission (Behn, 2001; Ebrahim, 
2010). Accountability has been generally defined 
as “the processes through which an organization 
makes a commitment to respond to and balance 
the needs of stakeholders in its decision-making 
processes and activities, and delivers against this 
commitment” (Lloyd, Oatham, & Hammer, 2007, 
p. 11). As nonprofit organizations face demands 
for accountability from multiple actors, those de-
mands vary widely depending on the nature of the 
relationship and the type of nonprofit. Differences 
have been among upward (to donors, regulators, 
supervisory authorities), downward (to custom-
ers/beneficiaries, public at large), and internal 
accountability, and among accountability from 
membership organizations, service organizations, 
and policy-advocacy networks (Ebrahim, 2010). 
If accountability is a prerequisite for trust, 
transparency is a prerequisite for accountability. 
Transparency has been included among core 
components of accountability, together with 
answerability or justification, compliance, and 
enforcement or sanctions. It has been defined 
as a process that involves collecting and making 
accessible for public scrutiny relevant information 
about the nonprofit, both in terms of governance 
and management: “relevant” meaning informa-
tion that satisfies the expectations of internal 
and external stakeholders (Ebrahim & Weisband, 
2007; Montserrat, 2009). 
The Relevance of Foundation 
Accountability and Transparency
Charitable foundations not only belong to the 
nonprofit sector as public-purpose, self-governed, 
and nonprofit distributing entities, but they also 
occupy a central position within it because many 
make grants to other nonprofits (Prewitt, 2006). 
Foundation accountability has been defined as 
“an obligation or willingness of public benefit 
foundations to account for their actions towards 
their stakeholders”; for the purpose of this article, 
foundation transparency will be defined as “an 
obligation or willingness of public benefit foun-
dations to publish and make available relevant 
data to stakeholders and the public” (European 
Foundation Center & Donors and Foundations 
Networks in Europe [EFC/DAFNE], 2011, p. 6).
Foundations, like other nonprofits, have been 
subjected to increasing demands for account-
ability in all Western countries. Across Europe, 
regulatory and tax legislation and self-regulation 
initiatives are incipiently and heterogeneously 
framing requirements for accountability and 
transparency from public-benefit foundations 
(EFC/DAFNE, 2011). Previous literature adds two 
foundation-specific arguments for increased rel-
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evance of nonprofit accountability: Foundations 
are largely undemocratic institutions applying 
tax-protected resources to promote their private 
vision of the public good in the public arena, and 
foundations create a state-protected power asym-
metry between those who control resources and 
those who seek them (Prewitt, 2006).
We further contend that accountability and 
transparency are relatively more crucial prereq-
uisites for good governance in foundations given 
their nonproprietary, nonmembership nature. 
Foundations represent an extreme case of agency 
problem: Their boards aren’t answerable to own-
ers (unlike businesses) or members (unlike asso-
ciations or cooperatives) that have an incentive to 
control their actions (Hopt, Walz, Von Hippel, & 
Then, 2006). Good governance of the foundation 
essentially depends on the ethical standing of its 
board (EFC/DAFNE, 2011). 
The focus of our empirical exercise will be on the 
state and evolution of transparency in corporate 
or company-sponsored foundations. There is 
no consensual or legal definition for corporate 
foundations that can be applied internationally. 
In the U.S., corporate foundations are separate 
legal entities that receive their assets or annual 
gifts from a (generally publicly held) company, 
thus remaining closely tied to the supporting firm 
(Foundation Center, 2008). For the purpose of this 
article, a corporate foundation is characterized by 
at least two of the following features: 
•	 It	has	been	founded	by	a	firm	whose	name	is	
frequently part of the foundation’s name.
 
•	 It	obtains	the	majority	of	its	operating	income	
from the firm’s gifts, meaning it does not raise 
funds either regularly or significantly. 
 
•	 Its	board	seats	owners,	directors,	or	top	manag-
ers from the related firm. 
 
•	 It	is	endowed	with	controlling	or	dominant	
shareholdings of the equity of one or several
firms.1
1 In several European countries, including Spain, there is no 
cap on shareholding or voting stock ownership by founda-
Corporate foundations thus show a complex 
connectedness to founding corporations in terms 
of governance (board control), management 
(filtering of managers and other staff members), 
and funding (endowment and nonendowment in-
come), resulting in their subordinate dependence 
on the firm (Rey-Garcia & Martin-Cavanna, 
2011). 
We contend that the foundation-specific agency 
problem resulting in increased need for account-
ability and transparency is more acute in the case 
of corporate foundations for two reasons. First, 
it is most often the firm’s managers – and not its 
shareholders – who decide whether the parent 
corporation will endow or fund the corporate 
foundation with – ultimately – shareholder re-
sources. Second, the corporate foundation board 
– which may not necessarily include shareholders 
of the parent firm – chooses the public-benefit 
purposes to which those resources will be applied.
Beyond these reasons for the special relevance of 
governance-related issues in corporate foun-
dations, their appeal for practitioners is also 
compounded by their fast growth and hybrid 
nature. Corporate foundations have been increas-
ingly used – in the U.S. since the 1950s; in Spain 
since the late 1980s  – as tax-efficient vehicles for 
corporate philanthropy and institutions support-
ing corporate social-responsibility (CSR) strate-
gies. Parallel to the mainstream adoption of CSR 
strategies by firms around the globe, corporate 
foundations have tended not only to drive the 
philanthropic component but also to enhance 
competitive advantage of corporate founders by 
focusing on communities or stakeholders of stra-
tegic interest for the firm, such as customers or 
employees (Carroll, 1991, 2008; Porter & Kramer, 
2002, 2006; Foundation Center, 2008). In addition, 
corporate foundations are public-benefit non-
profits founded, funded, or controlled by profit-
maximizing firms. Their dynamics as hybrid 
actors between the market and civil society are 
worth being studied in the context of the growing 
importance of hybrid institutional forms, which 
tions, and regulations on self-dealing between a firm and 
its related foundation are relatively looser in Europe than 
in the U.S.
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cross boundaries among the three traditional 
sectors of the economy (Letts, Ryan, & Gross-
man, 1997; Dees, 1998; Cooney, 2006; European 
Venture Philanthropy Association, 2006; Martin, 
2008). 
The purpose of this article is precisely to explore 
the forces underlying the adoption of good-gover-
nance policies and practices, particularly trans-
parency, in charitable foundations. The next sec-
tion discusses, in the context of a country study, 
the main factors behind the advancement of foun-
dation transparency according to previous theory 
and research. The following section proposes a 
simple tool for assessing foundation transpar-
ency. Through that tool, the stage of development 
of Spanish corporate foundations’ transparency 
is assessed and its evolution followed over three 
years. Overall results are discussed and possible 
explanations for the variability in corporate foun-
dation transparency are explored. Finally, sugges-
tions for foundation practitioners in general and a 
set of conclusions focused on corporate founda-
tions are presented.
Drivers for Accountability and 
Transparency: Spain as a Country Study
Previous theoretical and research studies have 
identified four main forces behind improved 
nonprofit accountability and transparency: so-
cietal pressure derived from scandals, demands 
for information from donors and other relevant 
stakeholders, pressure from regulators and public 
authorities, and third-party supervision (Ebrahim, 
2010). Another useful perspective has argued 
that different organizations tend to adopt similar 
structures due to a variety of institutional factors, 
including regulatory mechanisms, emulation or 
mimetic mechanisms, and standards and norms 
arising from collective action (DiMaggio & Pow-
ell, 1991). We have combined both theoretical 
perspectives into a framework composed by six 
drivers: 
1. regulatory pressures,
 
2. self-regulation, 
3. demands for information from donors and 
other key stakeholders, 
4. societal pressure derived from scandals,
5. emulation, and 
 
6. third-party assessment and information ser-
vices.
This six-drivers framework will be discussed in 
depth for the Spanish foundation sector. Why is 
the Spanish case relevant? In continental Eu-
rope, Spain is second only to Germany as home 
to a highly institutionalized foundation sector 
(Rey-Garcia & Alvarez-Gonzalez, 2011a), and 
has one of the highest number of registered 
public-benefit foundations (12,921 in 2009) in the 
European Union. From an international com-
parative perspective, differential features of this 
medium-sized, late- and fast-growth sector refer 
to age, size, and type of foundations; activity rates; 
and complex relationships with the state and the 
Roman Catholic Church. Spanish foundations are 
mostly young, small, and operating (30 percent 
of registered foundations lack significant recent 
activity). Of 9,050 active foundations, 9.2 percent 
are publicly controlled; an uncertain but signifi-
cant number of church-controlled foundations 
also exist. Total expenditures exceed €150,000 
for 53.6 percent (for 11 percent, that figure is 
over €2.4 million); 60.1 percent have total assets 
of more than €150,000. Since 1994, all registered 
foundations in Spain have been automatically 
granted charitable and nonprofit status, and can 
receive tax exemptions and tax-deductible contri-
butions if they comply with certain administrative 
requisites and strict reporting controls. Spanish 
foundations are basically configured as private 
entities with their own legal personality under 
civil law. All of them are nonprofit distributing, 
independently governed, nonmember, asset-
based, and public-benefit purpose (Rey-Garcia & 
Alvarez-Gonzalez, 2011b). 
Regulatory Pressures
It should be noted that the word “transparency” 
is not even mentioned in laws and regulations 
applicable to Spanish foundations; regulations 
focus exclusively on reporting to supervisory pub-
lic authorities. All registered foundations must 
annually file a report, standardized financial state-
ments, and activities plan with the supervisory 
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THE FoundationReview 2012 Vol 4:3 81
“protectorate.” The annual report must include 
information relative to governance: changes in the 
board and management, degree of accomplish-
ment of the activities plan, disaggregated number 
of beneficiaries, collaboration agreements with 
third parties, and degree of compliance of the 
distribution or payout rule. 
Once reviewed by the protectorate, those docu-
ments are filed in the corresponding foundation 
“register,” where, according to the law, “anybody 
can obtain information from them” (Ley 50/2002). 
But as the number of foundations has increased, 
supervision has become fragmented: The 58 
foundation protectorates and registers are short-
staffed and information systems are poor. As a 
result, the review of documents is often merely a 
formality and the ostensibly public information is 
hardly accessible to interested stakeholders. 
Self-Regulation
Spanish nonprofits in general and foundations in 
particular lack sectorwide norms and standards 
for good governance and transparency (Paz, 2008; 
Perdices, 2008). However, different good-gover-
nance principles, ethics codes, and transparency 
tools have been progressively adopted by some 
nonprofit and foundation networks coexisting 
in the country (De Andrés, Martín, & Romero, 
2006; CONGDE, 2007; Montserrat, 2009). The 
network of international-cooperation nonprof-
its pioneered its first ethics code in 1998, and 
published aggregated data on compliance from a 
set of transparency and accountability indicators 
taken from 90 websites and 50 annual reports of 
member organizations (CONGDE, 2007). Social-
action nonprofits adopted an operating standard 
for transparent management (Plataforma de ONG 
de Acción Social, 2003). In 2008, the Spanish As-
sociation of Foundations (AEF) passed a “Prin-
ciples” document (AEF, 2009), later subsumed 
under a “Good Governance Code” (AEF, 2011). 
This early and heterogeneous stage of develop-
ment of good-governance norms and standards 
arising from collective action, in the context of a 
fairly structured foundation field, suggests a lack 
of agreement within the sector about exactly what 
good governance, accountability, and transpar-
ency entail in practice. Such disagreement is also 
evident in the wide variability of disclosure poli-
cies regarding member data by those collective 
action platforms (CONGDE, 2007; Plataforma 
de ONG de Acción Social 2003; AEF, 2007, 2008, 
2011; Coordinadora Catalana de Funcaciones, 
2009). 
Demands for Information From Donors and 
Other Key Stakeholders 
Demands for information from external donors 
have probably been the key driver of improved 
transparency among foundations that fundraise 
regularly. Evidence shows an increasing num-
ber of foundations that raise funds from private 
sources volunteer to be evaluated every year by 
the Lealtad Foundation for compliance with 43 
good-governance principles, mostly concerning 
transparency (Fundacion Lealtad, 2009). It is no 
coincidence that social-action and international-
cooperation nonprofits have taken a leading role 
in adopting accountability and transparency 
standards, given that both types heavily depend 
on public funds and public agencies with tight 
reporting and monitoring requirements. Further-
more, foundations competing for public funds 
and private donors have already incurred the cost 
of producing the relevant information, and the 
incremental cost of making it accessible online to 
other key stakeholders can be considered insig-
nificant (Rey-Garcia, 2009). 
Societal Pressures Derived From Scandals
Spain has seen a number of foundation-related 
scandals in the last decade, including Gescartera 
in 2001, Anesvad and Intervida in 2007, Palau in 
2009, and Instituto Noos in 2011. Their epicenter 
frequently has been in Catalonia, Spain’s lead-
ing region in terms of foundation reporting (it is 
the only protectorate that allows online filing of 
reports), strengthened regulatory requirements, 
and nonprofit accountability and transparency 
self-regulation (the Catalan Coordinator of 
Foundations published its ethics code in 2006). 
Although this coincidence may suggest some 
degree of correlation between societal pressures 
and improved accountability, the influence of 
those scandals on foundation transparency has 
not been systematically researched yet.
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Emulation  
The degree to which emulation of peers or com-
petitors with the best practices has influenced the 
adoption of transparency practices by Spanish 
foundations is difficult to assess except on a case-
by-case basis. The scarcity of publicly accessible 
information on foundations is overwhelming; 
there are no countrywide directories or rank-
ings. Spanish foundations can choose between 
the favorable fiscal regime available for charitable 
foundations and public benefit associations, and 
the ordinary tax regime devised for any type of 
organization, including businesses. However, 
even if they choose the favorable fiscal regime 
(which translates into foundations being fully tax 
exempt in practice) their tax returns are not made 
public. This situation largely differs from that of 
US foundations filing their reports with the IRS, 
as these are online available. As a result, Spanish 
nonprofits are not listed by rating systems that are 
based on private tax reports, such as GuideStar or 
Charity Navigator (Rey & Alvarez, 2011c).
Third-Party Assessment
Evidence suggests three country-specific, third-
party, private information services have provided 
incentives for the advancement of foundation 
transparency. 
Since 2002, Lealtad Foundation has been publish-
ing online an annual report on compliance by 
fundraising foundations and associations with 
transparency and other good-governance poli-
cies. Although Lealtad is neither a ranking nor 
certifying body, the fast growth in the number 
of nonprofits that are voluntarily adhering to 
this service, and the few – though significant – 
withdrawals suggest not only that private donors 
respond to the information it provides, but 
also that nonprofits strategically respond to its 
quasi-certifying effects (Fundacion Lealtad, 2009; 
Gálvez, Caba, & Lopez, 2009).
Compromiso Empresarial Foundation (FCE), 
established in 2007, is an independent nonprofit 
whose mission is to advance good governance 
and transparency. It regularly publishes ethics and 
online transparency reports benchmarking firms 
such as television stations; public and nonprofit 
organizations including corporate foundations, 
family foundations, museums, and universities; 
and political parties.2
In 2009, the Spanish Association of Foundations 
launched the Institute for Strategic Analysis of 
Foundations (INAEF) to research foundations 
in the context of acute scarcity of empirical data 
on philanthropy. The institute’s main goal is to 
reinforce accountability and transparency in the 
sector, and it has recently published its first report 
on the organizational features and socioeconomic 
impact of the foundation sector (Rey & Alvarez, 
2011d). 3 
Proposal and Application of Transparency 
Indicators
Once general forces influencing foundation 
transparency have been discussed, our purpose 
will be to assess the state and development of 
Spanish corporate-foundation transparency and 
to explore possible explanations for its variabil-
ity in the context of the six-drivers framework. 
When translating our definition of foundation 
transparency into a useful set of transparency in-
dicators, the main challenge is to define the extent 
of “relevant” information. This requires identify-
ing and selecting relevant internal and external 
stakeholders for foundations and understanding 
their specific information needs. For the sake of 
simplicity, foundation transparency is defined 
as voluntary dissemination through the Internet 
(accessibility) of basic information about seven 
categories of indicators (relevancy): 
1. contact data, 
2. mission, 
3. programs and activities, 
4. management, 
5. board of trustees, 
2 http://www.fundacioncompromisoempresarial.com
3 The INAEF project was funded by a group of Spanish pri-
vate foundations: Ramon Areces, Marcelino Botin, Rafael 
Del Pino, ONCE, Santander, and Telefonica.
Assessing and Advancing Foundation Transparency 
THE FoundationReview 2012 Vol 4:3 83
6. economic information, and 
7. governance. 
This approach acknowledges the growing pre-
eminence of the web as an external communica-
tion medium for foundations, both vertically 
(with stakeholders such as donors, mass media, 
and partners), and horizontally (with peer orga-
nizations). The public in general and nonprofit 
stakeholders in particular expect basic informa-
tion on any issue of their interest and expect it 
to be accessible online. Of about 2,000 American 
nonprofits surveyed in 2008, 93 percent provided 
information about their programs and services on 
the web (GuideStar, 2009). Furthermore, this web-
based approach to transparency has been used to 
evaluate publicly listed companies and nonprofits 
(Sanz & Alda, 2009; CONGDE, 2007; Gálvez, 
Caba, & Lopez, 2009). 
A sample of 50 active corporate foundations was 
selected according to our working definition; a 
second criterion was that it represent a diversity 
of founder types. Those types include publicly 
listed and private companies, family and nonfam-
ily founders, and national and international firms; 
they are connected to a wide variety of industries. 
To assess transparency among such a sample, 
we first monitored the foundations’ compliance 
with transparency indicators for categories 1 to 
6 (13 items) during the second semester of 2009. 
However, transparency is a relative concept that 
must be contextualized within social demands for 
relevant information, institutional environments, 
and peer/competitor practices. For this reason, 
we benchmarked those results with those of two 
other groups of foundations that can be consid-
ered as conforming to best practices in terms 
of transparency, despite their different financial 
structures and geographic context:
•	 The top 50 grantmaking foundations of the U.S. 
by asset volume (Foundation Center, 2009). The 
U.S. was chosen as the international benchmark 
because its foundation sector is the largest and 
has been a role model for foundations interna-
tionally, particularly from a governance per-
spective. The U.S. sector has also successfully 
responded to increased demands for substan-
tive accountability with improved transparency 
and professionalism (Frumkin, 1999).
 
•	 Sixty	Spanish	foundations	that	regularly	
fundraise from nonprofits, unrelated firms, 
individuals, or the public sector (in the U.S. 
they would probably be labeled “community” or 
“public” foundations). These foundations have 
volunteered to be rated in terms of good-gov-
ernance and transparency principles by Lealtad 
Foundation (Fundacion Lealtad, 2009). While 
under GuideStar or Charity Navigator nonprof-
its cannot choose whether or not to be rated, 
we argue that a foundation’s voluntary decision 
to be rated signals its commitment to transpar-
ency policies and practices.
The degree of compliance with transparency in-
dicators within our sample was followed for three 
years (2009-2011). The main results are summa-
rized in Table 1. 
Explanations for Variability in Corporate-
Foundation Transparency
The first difference in transparency among the 
three samples in 2009 relates to web usage. While 
98 percent of the U.S. endowed sample and 100 
percent of the Spanish fundraising sample had 
their own websites, only 84 percent of the corpo-
rate sample utilized the web as an external com-
munication tool. Twenty-nine of the 50 corporate 
foundations had their own websites, whereas 14 
provided online information on the websites of 
their parent firms. 
The second difference arising from the bench-
marking exercise relates to the degree of compli-
ance with transparency indicators. Transparency 
is considerably higher for U.S. endowed and 
Spanish fundraising foundations for every item 
except “CEO or managing director”; the maxi-
mum gap between corporate foundations and 
the two best practices relating to items under the 
“economic information” category, followed by the 
“board” category. Additionally, top U.S. endowed 
foundations outperform the Spanish foundations 
with best practices for the “management,” “board,” 
and “economic information” categories. The “an-
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nual report” item registers the lowest degree of 
compliance for both Spanish samples, implying 
that the policies and processes through which 
those foundations are governed (governance), the 
degree to which mission and goals are achieved 
(effectiveness), and the sources and uses of funds 
(efficiency) cannot be assessed from online 
available information for 100 percent of corpo-
rate foundations and 77 percent of fundraising 
foundations. On the positive side, 80 percent of 
Spanish fundraising foundations publish their fi-
nancial statements online (outperforming the U.S. 
sample on this item), and 51 percent do the same 
with their external audit report. Overall, gaps 
TABLE 1  Assessing Foundation Transparency:  Benchmarking (2009) and Tracking (2009-2011) Spanish Corporate Foundations 
2009 Benchmarks Spanish Corporate Foundations 2009-2011
Transparency indicators: 
Categories and items
Percentage 
of compliant 
Top 50 U.S. 
foundations 
by asset size
Percentage 
of compliant 
Spanish 
fundraising 
foundations
Percentage 
of compliant 
corporate 
foundations 
2009
Percentage 
of compliant 
corporate 
foundations 
2010
Percentage 
of compliant 
corporate 
foundations 
2011
1. Contact data
1.1. Postal address 96% 100% 66% 78% 86%
1.2. Phone 96% 98% 62% 74% 82%
2. Mission
2.1. Mission and goals 96% 100% 80% 84% 84%
3. Programs and activities
3.1. Description 96% 100% 80% 86% 86%
3.2. Beneficiaries 94% 100% 72% 78% 84%
4. Management
4.1. CEO or managing 
director
90% 59% 58% 62% 62%
4.2. Other managerial staff 90% 47,5% 32% 32% 36%
5. Board of trustees
5.1. Members 92% 87% 70% 72% 80%
5.2. Profiles 82% 84% 16% 30% 36%
5.3. Positions and 
responsibilities
88% 41% 20% 66% 74%
6. Economic information
6.1. Financial statements 74% 80% 8% 18% 24%
6.2. Annual reports 70% 23% 0% 8% 12%
6.3. External audit reports 70% 51% 4% 14% 20%
7. Governance
7.1. Bylaws NA NA NA NA 18%
7.2. Good-governance 
code
NA NA NA NA 8%
Source: Authors’ elaboration from FCE 2010, and Martin-Cavanna 2011 and 2012
Assessing and Advancing Foundation Transparency 
THE FoundationReview 2012 Vol 4:3 85
widen when the comparison is between corporate 
and fundraising foundations within Spain, with 12 
indicators registering two-digit differentials. 
However, a general trend for improvement 
of corporate foundation transparency can be 
observed over time. Most substantial advances – 
with two-digit increases between 2009 and 2011 
– have involved “contact data,” “board,” and, to a 
lesser extent, “economic” indicators. The number 
of corporate foundations publishing their annual 
reports online has increased from none to six. 
The “economic information” category, however, 
remains the lowest compliant, and it has taken 
three years to reach percentages comparable to 
those of the new “governance” category intro-
duced in 2011. 
Going back to our proposed six-drivers frame-
work, some of those drivers seem of limited 
application when exploring possible explanations 
for the state and evolution of transparency prac-
tices among Spanish corporate foundations. No 
regulations specifically reinforcing transparency 
by corporate foundations exist, and they share the 
regulatory vacuum with other types of founda-
tions. None of the recent foundation-related scan-
dals has directly involved corporate foundations. 
The existence of demands for information from 
donors, however, is relevant when trying to 
explain why fundraising foundations outperform 
corporate ones in our benchmarking exercise. 
Spanish fundraising foundations seem to have 
understood that satisfying the demands for ac-
cessible and relevant information from external 
donors, either public or private, increases their 
funding opportunities through improved legiti-
macy. It is no coincidence that international-
cooperation and social-services foundations, both 
heavily dependent on fundraising, have paved the 
way in both self-regulatory efforts and voluntary 
adherence to private-information systems. Corpo-
rate foundations have not led any self-regulatory 
initiatives. They lack the built-in incentive for 
accountability that public foundations have in a 
diversified income structure based on fundraising 
from multiple sources. It is no coincidence either 
that the “economic information” category of indi-
cators still remains the most underperforming for 
this type of foundation, despite the general trend 
toward improvement over time.
Regarding mimetic mechanisms, in the case of 
corporate foundations both imitation of peer 
foundations and eventual emulation of par-
ent corporations should be considered. On the 
one hand, some corporate foundations identify 
themselves as “fourth sector” entities given their 
hybrid nature; on the other hand and according to 
theory, the greater the dependence for resources 
of an organization on another organization, the 
more similar the dependent organization will be-
come to the organization providing the resources 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Surprisingly enough, 
an average-to-average comparison for 2009 does 
not support the hypothesis of corporate founda-
tions emulating parent corporations in terms of 
transparency. While corporate foundations un-
derperformed both U.S. and Spanish foundations 
with the best practices, the majority of parent 
firms ranked among the best in good-governance, 
transparency, and CSR practices in the country at 
that time (Rey-Garcia & Martin-Cavanna, 2011). 
By contrast, emulation of peer foundations in 
combination with a third-party information 
service specifically focusing on corporate founda-
tions has probably been a significant force behind 
the gradual improvement of transparency be-
tween 2009 and 2011. Compromiso Empresarial 
Foundation has published an annual benchmark-
ing report on corporate-foundation transparency 
since early 2010 (FCE, 2010; Martin-Cavanna 
2011, 2012). Although the report is distributed 
both online and in print, exposure of its ratings 
through mainstream media has amplified its im-
pact. Expansión, an economic newspaper widely 
circulated among Spanish companies, and Antena 
3 TV, a private television station with its own cor-
porate foundation, have provided news coverage 
on the report (Medina, 2010; A. G., 2011; Antena 
3 TV, 2011, 2012). Evidence suggests a clear rela-
tionship between the release and content of the 
report and the strategic responses by corporate 
foundations included in its comparative rating. 
There were more email requests from foundations 
seeking further information, and more website 
visits to download the report. In addition, more 
than 30 percent of the corporate foundations in 
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our sample have directly contacted FCE to ask for 
advice or clarification on transparency criteria 
applied by the report. And it is also significant 
that, after FCE advanced plans to evaluate online 
availability of good-governance codes in the 2011 
edition, three foundations elaborated ex novo 
their codes and subjected them to board ap-
proval just in time to comply with that indicator. 
Finally, feedback from practitioners of corporate 
foundations covered by the report emphasized 
the incentives it has provided for continuous 
improvement: 
We read the news about the report in Expansión and 
it opened our eyes. We try to improve our rating a bit 
every year.
Congratulations for the report. It is an excellent re-
port that should help all foundations that really care 
about transparency.
We want to acknowledge the work behind the report 
as it stimulates Spanish corporate foundations to ad-
vance towards improved levels of transparency, and 
according to the most demanding standards.
The report will be a really useful tool to improve our 
website.
Thanks for the report. We should improve, and I am 
confident we will start to do so next year. … We are 
thinking about the actions we should take in order to 
improve online transparency relative to our compli-
ance of indicators in 2011. We would appreciate de-
tailed recommendations on the following proposed 
solutions….
Conclusions and Suggestions for 
Practitioners
The first contribution of this article has been to 
propose a six-drivers framework that can help 
explain variations in foundation accountability 
and transparency, both across different institu-
tional settings and over time. Conclusions for 
the Spanish case suggest that obstacles to the 
advancement of foundation transparency include 
a lack of awareness of the concept by regulators, 
fragmented and heterogeneous self-regulatory 
initiatives that lack compliance and monitor-
ing mechanisms, a lack of consensus about the 
practical implications of good governance, poor 
accessibility of public data in foundation registers, 
and privacy provisions governing foundation tax 
returns.
Regarding our benchmarking exercise focusing 
on corporate foundations, it suggests that differ-
ences in the financial structures of foundations 
compound with institutional factors to influence 
the development of transparency practices. Since 
corporate foundations do not raise funds from 
external donors, either private or public, they lack 
the intrinsic incentive for transparency that char-
acterizes fundraising or public foundations. In 
other words, corporate foundations – like other 
private, closely held ones – may have a higher 
intrinsic risk of behaving accountably only to the 
founders and funders they depend on financially, 
rather than to the foundation’s external stakehold-
ers and to society in general. 
On the positive side, applying the six-drivers 
framework to corporate foundations demon-
strates the potential of third-party assessment 
and information services for advancing transpar-
ency in the absence of specific regulations, widely 
accepted norms and standards, societal pressures, 
and built-in incentives related to the financial 
structure of the foundation. The positive impact 
of the FCE annual benchmarking reports and 
ratings on continuous improvement of corporate 
foundation transparency has been threefold: They 
have proposed a set of indicators to help founda-
tions select “relevant” information; they have 
provided incentives for putting preexisting con-
tents (i.e. bylaws, financial statements) online; and 
they have provided incentives for the adoption of 
new good-governance policies. Furthermore, the 
report’s benchmarking methodology has stimu-
lated emulation among corporate foundations, 
reminding them that, although closely held, they 
still have multiple relevant stakeholders beyond 
the parent company. Satisfying their demands 
requires specific commitments from corporate 
foundation boards and managers beyond behav-
ing accountably to the founding firm.
For foundation practitioners, the main challenge 
to improving transparency is selecting relevant 
information for each stakeholder group and com-
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municating it in an accessible way. In this sense, a 
key contribution of this article is combining a set 
of categories and indicators of relevant informa-
tion into a simple tool for assessing the state and 
development of transparency practices by all types 
of foundations in any country.
This article also reminds board members and 
managers that the Internet, and more specifically 
the foundation website, has become the main 
channel to respond transparently to demands for 
information from key stakeholders and society 
in general. Any stakeholder who wants to know 
more about a foundation will first consult its 
website. While a foundation may behave account-
ably to its civil or tax authority or to its inter-
nal donors, it may not be accountable to other 
stakeholders or to the public unless it voluntarily 
implements accountability and transparency prac-
tices through the web.
Our final suggestion is that founding companies 
advocate for voluntary implementation of good 
governance, accountability, and transparency 
practices in the foundations under their con-
trol. This research demonstrates that channeling 
corporate philanthropy through the creation of 
organizations with their own legal personality 
requires implementing ad hoc good-governance 
policies beyond those of the parent corporation. 
One of the main advantages of corporate philan-
thropy over other CSR strategies is its observable 
nature – most CSR processes are not noticeable 
beyond the limits of the firm. Visible adoption of 
best accountability and transparency practices 
by corporate foundations would bring two types 
of positive consequences: It would improve the 
legitimacy of corporate foundations in the eyes of 
external stakeholders and society in general, and 
would prevent diluting potential benefits to the 
reputation of corporate philanthropy, ultimately 
increasing the credibility and social impact of the 
parent company’s CSR strategies.
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